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MOzambique with its 300,000 square miles of territory
and approximately 7,000,000 inhabitants of whom only 100,000
are Europeans is a relatively poor and primarily agricultural
country with Lfew known sub-soil resources, Five centures of
Portuguese occupation have done noth~ng to prepare the indige-
nous population, 99% of whom are illiterate with an estimated
annual income of leis than~50, for either self government or
independence. The Ninet~enth Century type of colonialism which
still permits the Metropole to siphon off profits produced
under a feudalistic system using near slave labor (a field
hand earns from 15-25 cents per day while a high priced steve-
dore gets 89 cents per day) will be little changed by the
much per a.l.dedrevision of the "Organic Law of the Portuguese
Overs~as Territories". This belated sop to world opinion is
a fraup and deception designed to perpetuate the social in-
justices without which MOzambique products could not compete
in world markets.oo
4 Although the Portuguese pride themselves on being color
~ ~ blind, which is·(true so far as social relation~hins are con-
~ cerned, )they practice an economQc and polilical type of
o ~iiparthe~d which holds the Africans in a state of near servitude.
~~K~he legalistic minded Portuguese enact constructive legisla-
~ ~ion only to prevent its implementation with a jungle of
.~ '~ureaucratic regulations. Nowhere is this better illustrated
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than in the field of educi{tinn.:·''Itte:!~w'pr.ovw.e'slJ.J11"~t.salpublic
education through the high:Sbhqpl ~u~'the:pa~~k~y ~~'kidWledge of the
Portuguese language which"togetl1er"'~i"th'an'ag~ iinct.~''!"eqUirement ef-
fectively eliminates more than 99% of the African students. Similarly~
in the political field repeal of the degrading "indigenatot" or
"uncivilized" classification theoretically made all native Africans
Portuguese citizens with voting rights equal to those of the European
[
Portuguese, Actually by means of literacy and tax requirements the
.
government disenfranchised all except a handful of "Uncle 'l'om"type
Africans.
While there is an outward appearance of stability insured by the
presence of some 20,000 troops together with a heavy concentration of
police and thousands of paid informers, the volcano of resentment seethes
just below the surface. Despite strict censorship, controlled press
and radio, denial of the right of assembly (a gathering of more than 20 -
persons is punishable by imprisonment) opposition to the Salazar policies
is much in evidence, It is estimated that 80% of the European Portuguese
community are opposed to the Salazar regime and would welcome an auto-
nomous Mozambique providing, of course, economic and political power
remained in European hands, .Only about 20% would be willing to live
with or under an African dominated government,
CONFIDENTIAL
The extent to which the Mozambique Liberation Front, led by
Eduardo ~bndlane, enjoys the~active support of the indigenous popula-
tion or the nature of its plans remain unb,own due to the FJricans'
well founded fear and mistrust of the white man. Unfortunately t4is
extends even to the well-intentioned missionaries who have the closest
~~ontact wit the indigenous population. The only exceptions are the
~~ half dozen "0 osition" la ers ho act jointly as defense counselors
~~ or both Africans and uropeans charged with anti-government activities,
The recent dock strike in Lourenqo Marques, reported acts of suspected
a
sabotage, and the rapid increase in the number of~~iQaD louth disap-
pearing from the Province, destination "north" I inCllcdt: the squall
line of the approaching African front. In view of the fact that the
linguistic and ethnic divisions of Mozambique run from west to east it
is not impossible that a political upheaval could result in fragmenta"
tion rather than independence, Credence is given this theory by virtue
of the fact that the soon-to-be independent but land-locked territories
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland are certain to cast covetous eyes on Mozambique'
deep-wat er por t s ,
As the foremost leader of the free world dedicated to the principle
t of the right of self-determination, it is ~ndatory that the UnitedStates make 't Afrlcans of MOzaIDblque. Prompt
,
1nl aa ion of an Lnf ormatLon and cultura _p arge rimarily for
Africans yet so tailoredifs ~o avoid openly offending the host govern-
ment is a must. FD.re!tCl.nd.ed.J.?ljlI}nJ.nq.,wi.tttrf!/illfs o pro_''lidingeducation
_~ and technical assis~~~ce:InblUti!ng:Pe~~e:Cot~s ~epresentatl0n should
~ be high priority proj~ct~, :E~1~'re-e~anl1~ment of the American
(~ Consulate in Beira'ls'esien~iaI as'an'observation post north of the
Zambezi if proper political coverage of this sensitive area is to be
aChieved,
.. '.
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On completion of my :f1~!;t:y~.irIii M:J.za~iciae:I:'sho~ld like to
review the situation and~~b:r~cord.~t ~mPTe$s1~ns:o~.the country, its
people andproblems. This, the most populace of the Portuguese overseas
territories with its nearly seven million inhabitants, only approxim-
ately 100,000 of whom are Europeans, is for all practical purposes
simply an extension of the Metropole police state and as such is quite
devoid of either personal or political freedom. The appalling poverty
and illiteracy of the indigenous population is irrefutable proof of ...:
the exploitative nature of nearly five centuries of Portuguese rule.
Hi storical.
Many of Mozambique's present day problems are rooted in the
colonizing methods used by the Portuguese beginning in the early part
of the Sixteenth Century when their primary concern was the establish-
ment of a string of forts along the East African coast to protect their
sea routes across the Indian Ocean to the Orient. Only within the
last century was any serious attempt made to extend Portuguese influ-
ence into the hinterland except for trading stations established along
the Zambezi River. Since the eastward thrust of British colonialism
in Africa stopped at the foothills of the mountain range forming the
western boundary of Mozambique, almost the entire area between tide
water and the mountains was barren of western influence. It was forr the most part a vast north-south corridor in which tribal conflicts
I ebbed and flowed interrupted· only by raids of the Arab slaverers.
Until well into the Nineteenth Century the much-touted civilizing and
Christian influence of the. Portuguese was confined to the chapels of
their coastal forts. The decline of Portugal as a maritime power with
the concomitant shrinkage in its overseas empire ultimately forced
this nation of sailors to carry the anchor inland. Even then they con-
trived to transfer the burden of the country's economic development
onto the shoulders of other Europeans using the device of long term con-
cessions to private and quasi-governmental foreign companies. A good
example was the Mozambique company which built the railroad opening up
the mineral treasure house of the Rhodesias and developed the swamp
surrounding Beira into Mozambique's second largest and busiest port.
Working on the theory that what the natives didn't know wouldn't hurt
them, the Portuguese deliberately denied them access to educational
facilities thereby permitting whole generations of the indigenous popu-
lation to grow up in ignorance. Small wonder then that when the first
shock wave from the African political earthquake of the second half of
the Twentieth Century hit this bastion of classic colonialism the
Portuguese reaction was one of fear and frustration prompting a retreat
,into the refuge of the past guided by their 20-20 hindsight vision.
[
The Portuguese are indeed a paradox, simultaneously pursuing a policy
of social multi-racism on the one hand while practicing economic and
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income of only $50 per year. It has few natural resources and only
limited proven mineral deposits. The US-owned WDzambique Gulf Oil
Company has conducted exploratory operations for 14 years without
success. Of its six and three-quarter million Africans, more than 90%
live off the land. Less than one-third of the Province's land area
of some 300,000 square miles is suitable for agriculture and of this
only 10% has been brought under cultivation. The balance is either too
wet or too dry. Cotton, the largest export crop is grown not as might
be expected on large plantations but on tiny individual plots scattered
throughout the Province from which it is collected by the Portuguese
concessionaires who have exclusive rights as to the determination of
both its quality and price. Up until last year the concessionaires in
connivance with the local Portuguese officials operated what to all
intents and purposes was a slave labor system. It worked like this:
The Government granted concessions to a dozen Portuguese, usually repre-
sentatives of important companies in the Metropole. They in turn pro-
vided the seed and the ginning machinery necessary to process the cotton
for export to Portugal, the only legal market. The local officials
gave the natives the choice of either raising cotton or being arrested
as unemployed. Under the old law, all indigenous were required to
work a minimum of six months -per year unless they could prove that they
were self-employed 'iIith a cert ein level of income. Since relatively
few of the six and three-quarter million P.fricans were even in the
money economy much less self-sufficient, the choice was academic. The
raising of food crops was discouraged by the officials in order to
bind the native to cotton production. The net result was that failure
of the African to produce a reasonable amount of cotton meant an empty
belly or worse. The legal abolition of forced labor last year has
changed only the mechanics of the system, the results are still pretty
much the same. The Portuguese like the French abolished all paramount
chiefs in order to prevent the tribal structure from becoming a political
force. The regulo, or local chief, who is appointed and paid by the
I
governmentis called in by the local Portuguese officials who along
with the concessionaire tell him the levy of collection expected from
his area. It is made quite clear to him that failure to deliver the
quota will result in his .replacement.
In the bottom lands of the river valleys and coastal deltas the
plantation-type crops of sugar, cobra and sisal are grown. The success-
ful~operation of the plantations depends to a large extent upon a
constant and adequate supply of·cheap native labor. Wages are low,
running from $6 per month plus keep for the ordinary field hand, to
$15 per month for a tractor operator. As in the case of cotton, the
. .
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sale of crops is directed:by:Yhe' .Pt>rt<!gu"e!!ie.'(Sqv~rnlllE:l'lt1,puallyto the
Metropole·at prices often:~uostent~al~y ~~l~w~hbs~:pr~~iling in the
wor Ld markets. The repeai' of-·the =1a"':i>elOnu.Hi:ng. fO~c:2cl."labor has com-
pelled the plantation operators to improve the housing, hospital and
messing facilities for their workers, in order to recruit and hold an
adequate labor force which on some plantations runs as high as 20,000
workers. Since strikes are illegal and any type of free trade union
movement forbidden, the bargaining power of the agricultural worker is
nil; nevertheless, the plantation operators are apprehensive that in
thecbsence of compulsory work laws it will become increasingly diffi-
cult to hold workers in the remote rural areas. A tour of duty with
the Portuguese military or work in the mines of South Africa with much
better wages and better health and working conditions together with the
advent of the transistor radio is slowly but surely spreading the word
"out back" about the real or imaginary advantages of town life, not
the least of which is a chance to acquire some "book learning". While
the native can no longer legally be compelled to sign labor contracts
binding him to his employer, the economic realities of earning a living
leave him pretty much at the mercy of the plantation owner. The
combination of a 99% illiteracy rate and a police state bureaucracy
afford scant protection for' the individual rights of the worker. .
Religion and Education
Despite nearly five centuries of Christianizing effort by
the Portuguese the vast ~ajority of the indigenous population remains
pagan. Those of the Catholic persuasion are strongest in the area
south of the Zambezi Ri ver vwhere vsome 450,000 have embraced the faith.
The approximately 150,000 Protestants, representing the accumrnulated
effort of aO-odd years of missionary work largely done by Americans,
[are clustered in the SuI do Save area within a 300 mile radius of thecapital city of Lourenqo Marques.
The MUslim religion, brought by Arab traders to Africa on the winds
of the northeast monsoon, has set down deep roots in Mozambique. Its
multi-racial character together with its ready acceptance of the principlE
of multiple wives struck a responsive chord among the Afridans with the
result that the Province's MUslim population of nearly 1.000,000 is
double the combined total of Christian converts. Shadowy in character
but exercising considerable influence among the African population are
the more than 2QO off-shoots of the Protestant faith which combine
selected Christian doctrine with the mystique of pagan worship into a
volatile and politically dangerous mix, orientated along racial lines.
In any underveloped area the key to opportunity is education. In
Mozambique, because of the peculiar church~state relationship, that
key rests in the pocket of the Catholic missionaries to whom the Portu-
guese turned over ~eaponsibility.tot.t~e. p~e~p'r~mary indoctrination of
the indigenous PORU15ticn:: TEi$ arran1ement:wa~:agreeable to the church
since acceptance o.~:~~~:gu~err.~~t s~b~i~¥~~~ ~dt entail any specific
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commitment as to the nUmb~:di'~ia~sr~o~~:a~? ~up'i~s~" Ln actual prac-
[
' tice it permitted the mor9 hmbi~ic~s ~~r~m~:~ ~inancJ construction
of churches and cathedrals; iun newspapet~ ahd'engag~'iw'other under-
takings quite unrelated to the educational field.
CONFIDEN'rIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
The Protestants who are not beneficiaries of the government largesse
are also 'permitted to conduct pre-primary classes whose principal func-
tion like that of the Catholics is instruction in the Portuguese language.
While the government looks upon the pre-primary school principally as ,'
a place for Portuguese language instruction, both Catholic and Protestant
used it to achieve their own parochial purpose of converting the heathen-
to Christianity. If in the process ~ne of the by-products was a knowledge
of the Portuguese language, they had no objection. In both the Catholic
and Protestant missions schools the stress was on religion not education.
Furthermore, the missions' day-to-daY,reqtiirements of food, clothing and
shelter for its boarding students made it mandatory that the Africans
be taught the fundamentals of farming and manual training in order to
keep the mission as self sufficient as possible. Under these circum-
stances it was much easier for a handful of educated missionaries to
learn the native language than for thousands of illiterate Africans to
learn Portuguese. The result was that despite the legal requirements
that all instructions should be in Portuguese the native tongue, became
for all practical purposes the language of religious instruction and
manual apprenticeship. This goes a long way to explain the fact that
while government statistics Show half a million African students enrolled
in Catholic mission schools plus additional thousands in their Protestant
[
'counterparts, onl~ a ~raction of these ~er~ able to pass the Portugu~se
language test, wh~ch ~s the key for adffilss~onto the government publ~c
school system. , -
The Portuguese seem to be fully committed to the proposition that
all problems can be legislated out of existence. The jungle of laws
and regulations pertaining to labor, education, civil rights and other
social matters offers ample opportunity for the jingoist to build a
plausible case of their adequacies in the protection of human rights.
Unfortunately the discretionary powers vested in the administrative
branch of the government responsible for implementation of the legisla-
tion not only makes possible but actually invites circumvention of the
basic law. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the field of
education.
Official visitors on tours arranged by the Agencia de Turismo de
Mo~ambique are quite often impressed by the apparent size and scope of
the government school construction program to be found in the larger
coastal towns which have substantial European communities. The modern
design,of the buildings and the completeness of their equipment gives
every appearance of a balanced and forward looking educational program.
Actually ,'this is--net.the .case..~t aJI, . Thoe.Rutldings represent a
........... e iii 06. 00 .:llll '• w.. v .. ~.~ ~ 4o '4o O4o '; ::" :.: ::4o .... . "" ..... .......
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determined effort on the ~vt'"Of' Gvver.nor..GsJi&"J. .!\d.mi:roalM ria Manuel
Sarmento Rodrigues to pump :a:'liHl~ l"ie''I;Jl"()'tq tflti> :"ihearchaic educa-
tional body particularly iJf LlJ.e'.filUd;:c:lfo,/l.d,J~lt;;3-ns~~lt~~!(,nand manual
training. Since he assumed office a year or so ago, Admiral Sarmento
Rodrigues has within the limits of the Province's finances and the high
bounaprecepts of his superiors in Lisbon made an honest effort to im-
prove the educational facilities for a limited number of the population.
Unfortunately, the dearth of educational facilities has much deeper
roots that go down into the historical Portuguese premise that so long"
as the mass of the people are denied any substantial degree of formal
education the danger 6f their being a challenge fo the established order.
will continue to be minimal.,
The law provides that educational facilities beginning with the
primary school and extending through the lyceu should be made available
to all Portuguese citizens. Since the abolition of the indigenato
classification last year this applies equally to Europeans and Africans
alike. However, the administrative regulations require that all appli-
cants for the primary school must pass a~ortuguese lan2*age te?t and
further stipulates that the applicantGnu t not bave rea ed his or he~
14th birthda at the time of application. To the Portuguese population
o uropean extrac ~on ~s presen s no problem but to the African it
usually means the door to the public school system at least as a day
student is slammed tight against him. In the first place, unless the
applicant lives in one of the one-half dozen sizeable urban areas in
the Province it is almost certain that he will be part of a tribal com-
munity which normally expects children to herd cattle or perform other
chores until they are 12 or 14 ye51rs of.age. This rules out their
enrollment in both the Portuguese language classes of the mission schools
andin the special language courses run by Portuguese troops recently
,introduced by the government as part of their psycho-social campaign
to win support of the native population. The net result is that by
the time the ordinary African child has acquired the necessary command
of the Portuguese language he is over-age. For those who do manage
to overcome this first obstacle there are many other barriers. For
example, the age limit for admission to the lyceu is 16 and requires
a stiff examination which by its very nature places the African student
t a distinct disadvantage. Furthermore, the African who managed to
enter the primary school at thirteen finds that on completion of the
course he is seventeen, or one year over the age limit for admission to
the lyceu. No better refutation to the Portuguese party line that
"our public schools are open to all" can be found than by taking a look
at the pictures of the various graduating classes hung in the corridors
of the Salazar Lyceu in Lourenqo Marques.
It is
government
l>bzambique
product of
precisely because of these built in discriminations of the
education system that the present-day leadership of the
Nationalist Liberation movement is almost exclusively the
missio~'s~hbQi$:"Wn~~e'~o:qve~cpme:khe hurdles to a public
• •• • 0 ~~. 0 ~ o. ~. .: '
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education and because the mi~~~d~~.~~ p~bhi~it~d:tl1'laV'f?om offering
primary much less secondary schGol:cours~& o~ ihstf.uc~ibn,: :he most
promising Africans are selec~ed:by·the·~i&si~naiie; t~ enroll as
students in the mission seminaries which are designed to turn out
nati~e pastors. Of these a very few are given study grants in Europe
or the United States where they proceed to further their education and
where in several instances they have acquired university degrees. Oc-
casionally an African who has the advantage of being born in a large
town and who through intervention of a European manages to gain entrance
to the government school system completes the course and is awarded a
degree from a Metropole university. Rare as these cases are they do -
make it possible for the Portuguese to use them as Exhibit A in their J
hard sell campaign to perpetrate the fiction that "We are all Portuguese
together". It is significant that few if any of this elite ever elect
to return to the land of their birth. They prefer to enjoy the socially
multi-racial society of the Metropole where their income will be measured
in the coin of the realm and not in bananas, coconuts or mealy mealy as
it most probably would be if they were to return to the overseas terri-
tories and try to carve themselves a place among the "colon" community.
Economy
The Mozambique economy is based on agriculture with cotton,
sugar, copra, cashew, tea and sisal being the more important export
crops, augmented by some cattle raising and lumber. The mineral re-
sources are few, and after 15 years of exploration there is no evidence
that oil exists in commercial quantity although fairly substantial
amounts of natural gas have been found": In the economic as in the
other fields the Portuguese have been long on talk and short on perform-
ance. The Provincial authorities responsible for economic planning
have shelves filled with all kinds of surveys and development plans but
that is about hll that they have. An examination of the Province's
economy reveals that as far as the private sector is concerned the
Portuguese have committed very little of their own money. Their general
policy has been to let others invest while they by means of administra-
tive techniques siphon off to the Metropole a high percentage of
earnings. As I stated earlier, the major export crop, cotton, is pro-
duced not as might be expected on large plantations but on small indi-
vidual plots and communal tribal lands under a feudalistic system which
leaves the Portuguese sole arbitrators as to price and quality class-
ification. Furthermore, the law requires that all cotton be exported
to the Metropole at prices about one-half those of the world market.
The same applies to Mozambique's second largest export crop, sugar.
An examination of the source of capital investment reveals that
the sisal plantations located largely in the northern areas adjacent to
the Tanganyika border are owned and operated by Germans, many of whom
fled from Tanganyika following the loss of that territory to the
.~ .~a v~~ ~ ~ 010 ~g • ~ ~ ~o, ~~~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ o. ~ g g. ~.• •• • • ••• • ••• •• ••
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Page 9.. ... .. . .. ... ... . ... .. ~• •• ••• ••• • •• •• ••British at the end of World W~r:~.: The ~~o·lat~~t· s~~ar:e~tates at
lllabo and Moremeu, which betw.ee~.th.e~..:.c::our.f.£Oor:30m~ :90°(..ofthe
sugar export, are largely owned by British investors with a Portuguese
director as a front man. The Province's only coal mine is Belgian
owned and operated. Some idea of the efficiency of this enterprise
can be gathered from the fact that the mine's power requirements are
supplied by diesel engines, the fuel for which must be brought several
hundred miles inland. The production of copra is dominated by Swiss
and other international capital. The tea plantations are almost ex-Delusively owned and run by British interests. Only in the cattleraising and lumber industry is there any predominance of Portugueseinvestment. .. ... . ".. .
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Industrial development has been confined to a cement plant, an
oil refinery and a flour mill plus a sprinkling of small light in-
dustries; i.e., a textile plant at Vila Pery, bottling plants in Beira
and Lourenqo Marques, a shoe factory and caShew decauterizing plants.
On numerous occasions the Governor General has told me of the tremen-
dous potential of the Zambezi Basin which is supposed to.have large
deposits of iron, coal, copper and titanium. All that is required,
according to the government planners, is about $250,000,000 to provide
the necessary infrastructure of rail, road, and water communications
plus the construction of a high dam and hydroelectric complex on the
upper Zambezi River in the District of Tete.
-Although the Provincial authorities consistently bemoan the
reluctance of foreign investors±o commit additional funds, at the
same time they are guilty of placing all kinds of administrative road-
blocks in the path of venture capital. Discriminatory exchange contro 1,
requirements that Portuguese retain majority stock control, an uncertain
legal basis for repatriation of profits and capital, together with a
jungle of bureaucratic red tape have driven off potential investors
from South Africa, Europe and the United States. There is general agree-
ment in the foreign banking community, dominated by British and South
African interests, that the Banco Naqional Ultramar (BNU) which although
privately owned by Metropole interests is the Province's bank of issue
and largely responsible for the impossible foreign investment climate.
A number of foreign businessmen have told me that even when they have
obtained permission from the exchange board the BNU refuses to sell
them foreign exchange at the legal rate; only after paying a premium
are they able to meet their commitments.
The apparent contradiction between the predominantly foreign - i
ownership of the facilities of agricultural production and the adminis-
trative system designed to discourage new foreign commitments can be
better understood if we examine the conditions under which the existing
foreign investments were originally made and see how they lend them-
selves to the over~ll;~a~t~n ~f ~o~fugu2se:6xt~active colonialism.
The answer to the r~c~li~~ ~o~~~e~e'~nYes~~en~ pattern lies like so
many other answers--in--Hs n-ationaJ:-h±si:'ory.·'The"decline of Portugal
CON FIDENTI AL
----------,c-------------------------------------
CONFIDENTIAL A-32
1.«0. Marques
Page 10
CONFIDENTIAL
as a world power and its sub&e~en~·~dcupati~h.by:~a~:tlr~stically re-
duced the amount of capital ~~~1anle:fo;.~nv€s~~e~f ~n:1he:overseas
• • u ~.. •• • ~.. w ~ ~ ~provinces. What capital there ~a$ rouhti-i{-more profrteblfr to invest
elsewhere than in relatively poor Mozambique. The British with their
aggressive policy of expansion in East Africa at the expense of the
Portuguese created a serious problem for Mozambique. Pursuing a policy
"If you can't lick them join them", the Portuguese granted extensive
long-term land concessions to the British and to other foreign companies..
This permitted the British to gain their objective of acquiring use of --
deep-water ports on the Indian Ocean from which to export the wealth
of their hinterland holdings. The Portuguese on their side were thus
able to retain administrative control over the production of the con-
cessionaires 9perating within Mozambique. Under this arrangement, the
Portuguese through use of their forced labor laws guaranteed to the
foreign plantation owners a large and consistent supply of cheap labor
which kept production costs well below those of competing areas. In
turn, the producer was required to sell the raw materials exclusively
o Portugal where they were processed for both the world markets and
for resale under a high protective tariff back to the very colonies
which produced them. It was an hermetically sealed trade circuit which
resulted in handsome returns to the so-called 100 families of the -
Metropole. The Portuguese used foreign investment capital to finance
he production facilities yet managed to retain control of the produc-
tion itself. So long and only so long as the Portuguese can keep
agricultural wages down to the prevailing 15-20 cents daily rate cen
the system work, but any kind of enlightened labor policy wou l.dbe
almost certain to bring about its collapse.
The Portuguese traditionally have recognized the importance of
sea ports to their minerally rich but Tandlocked neighbors of Rhodesia,
Nyasaland and the Transvaal. It was this Lealization that prompted
them to develop the ports of Beira and Louren~o Marques which together
account for nearly half the Provincial Government's income. It was
quite apparent to the Portuguese_ that geography-had given them the
turnstiles through which the production of the rich East African hinter-
land had to pass and that investment in the public sector concentrated
on port installation~,coastal shipping and rail lines running to their
western borders with South Africa, Swaziland and the Rhodesias would pay
off handsomely. The Portuguese reasoning is soundly based since ap-
roximately 90% of the traffic passing through Beira and Lourenqo
Marques is transit and as in the case of other economic activity low
wages are an important factor in the success of the operation. Dockers
are paid the equivalent of 89 cents for an eight hour shift; railway'
workers receive somewhat less although they get food and shelter allow--
ances in addition to their basic wage. A number of the senior officials
in the Provincial Government have told me very frankly that they see
-little economic justification for the heavy capital investment required
to provide the Proy~n~~ wjt~.•t~~ ~nf~as~~uct~~~.necessary to i~s econ-
omic development. :~eY t~ason:~hat t~~ ~ut~~e ~f:Mozamblque lles not
so much in attemptlng:~o:de~elb~ i~~'own:te$~r~e~ of questionable worth
... .. .. 'O 'O... .. ..
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transit facilities for the Pr~w';ii"v~e:r.1!,:jc:i:i:b.~fJffiid~ocF~g.~~ghbors.
Closely linked to port development is the agreement between South
Africa and Portugal signed in 1928 providing that 47 1/2 percent of all
traffic in and out of the Transvaal must pass through the port of
Louren~o Marques. In exchange South Africa was given the right to re-
cruit annually up to 100,000 natives for work in the South African
mines, recruitment to be restricted to the area between the 22nd and 26th
parallels of south latitude. A fee equivalent to 15 cents per body plus
additional 27 1/2 cents annual rental charge was to be paid, the total
amount not to be less than $500,000 annually payable in gold. Even
more important was the provision that 50% of all native wages was to
be withheld by the mine owners and surrendered to the South African
Government which would turn it over to the Portuguese Government in the __
form of gold bullion. On completion of his term of indenture labor,
usually 1-2 years, the Mozambique worker would receive the unpaid
balance of his wages from the Mozambique Government payable in local
escudos which are often discounted against the currency of the Metropole.
CONFIDENTIAL
The South African Consul General told me he estimates this blood
and sweat export yields the Portuguese from 8-10 million dollars gold
annually plus a sizable amount of South African currency sent back to
the fa~ilies of the Mozambique workers through the mail or with return-
ing miners. There is a widespread but erroneus impression that the
Mozambique native labor is shanghai8d into workinq in the South African
mines. Nothing could be further _from_the truth. The Witwatersrand
Native Labor Association recruiting centers in the bush are constantly
overwhelmed with applicants who regard work in the mines as a badge of
honor. In a more material sense, due to the absence of gainful employ-
ment in Mozambique, work in the mines is the only way the native can
earn the price of a wife, payoff his debts, or build a house. In
other words, it is about their most important avenue into the money
economy. Coming events are already casting their shadows before them
and the local head of the South African Railways told me recently that
on October 1 of this year his government intends to abrogate the treaty.
The reasons are part political and part economic. The new oil refinery
at Durban and the proposed construction of a pipe line into the
Transvaal will make the use of Louren~o Marques uneconomic for petro-
leum imports. This will reduce the import load factor passing through
Lour-enco Marques by an estimated 70% with a corresponding loss in the
port's revenue.
The Portuguese hope to offset part of the Transvaal traffic loss
with shipment of iron ore from Swaziland when the rail connection, due
to be finished sometime in 1964, is completed. This new traffici how-ever, will be restricted to bulk cargo and will run to only a mi lion
tons annually. Hov~ri~g ~n.~h~.b&ch.o~ the.P.o~tu~ese mind is the
haunting fear that:~n~~l~-t~e ~l~iisa~ ~jt~~ti~n:in the Province
• •• ••• ••• • •• •• ••
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deteriorate, South Africa mi~ht:~.~¢ad.~tn tne:d~~~~~ut of a
deep-water port in Northern Mat~l ~hi~h wdulU e~i~ha~e:'dep~ndence of
the Transvaal on the port of:LOu~~n9o:Ma~quei and~leav~,i~.to wither
on the economic vine. In the past, the Portuguese have been confident
that xhe Transvaal's requirements for native labor would always be suf-
'f i ci.errto Lnsur.ethat the 1928 agreement would remain in force. This
is no longer true. It is estimated that the closing down of marginal
mining operations in South Africa will create a labor surplus of some
130,000 Africans a year. Already the more than 800,000 foreign Bantu
laborers pose a serious economic and indirectly a political problem for
the Verwoerd Government. The latest statements of senior South African'
officials indicate that they intend to take whatever action is necessary
to reduce the size of this foreign work: force. As was the case in the
Rhodesias, this action will inevitably result in the deportation back
to ~Dzambique of thousands of Africans who, through their foreign
earnings, now make a valuable contribution to the Government and people --
of the Province.
CONFIDENTIAL
In the absence of a discovery of substantial oil or readily
accessible mineral deposits, the economic outlook for MOzambique is not
particularly bright. Given a reasonable degree of political stability
in neighboring countries which in turn would assure their continued
economic development, MOzambique should be able to develop its deep
water ports as the logical gateway for the exports of its land-locked
n e i qh bo r s ,
It is abundantly clear that any significant development of the
Province's own.resources is large-lydependent on the influx of sub-
stantial amounts of capital, either from the Portuguese Metropole or
from other countries. To date there is no evidence that Portuguese
private capital is prepared to enter the ~bzambique market. At the
same time, it is extremely doubtful that the Portuguese Government has
either the will or capacity to finance a comprehensive development
program. The alternative is for~ign capital, either in the form of
government-to-government loans or private investment. The historical
reluctance of the Portuguese Government to borrow and their apparent
indifference to private venture capital would seem to rule out either
of these two approaches. The economy of Mozambique has the form and
substance of a Seventeenth Century colony. Until something happens
either here or in Lisbon to give the Province a completely new politi-
cal as well as economic outlook MOzambique is destined to stagger along
using outmoded means and methods of production completely dependent on
near slave labor to maintain its competitive position in world markets.
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be bqsed on recognition of the fact that it is the direct result of
(
police state conditions prevalent in Portugal itself. The rights of
the individuals are lost in a jungle of legalistic jingoism and bureau-
cratic administrative procedure. Certain modifications of the usual
dictatorship structure have been introduced to adjust the system to a
situation wherein 98% of the population are alien in race and culture
to the government which rules them. For example, although the abolition
of the "indigenato" classification presumably gave both African and
European the same voting rights, the regulations implementing the basic
law established tax and literacy requirements which effectively dis-
enfranchised 99% of the African population. Portuguese citizens of
European origin also suffered from a serious infringement of their
political rights.
The Uniao Na9ional is the only recognized party and efforts~
form an opposition party have been ruthlessly suppressed. In the~
presidential election ~ group of European Portuguese in Louren90 .
Marques did put up an opposition slate comprised of candidates of
considerable talent and community standing. A few days before the
e~ection took place, their party platform was declared subversive and
the leaders arrested. Many~zambicanos, among them prominent laWYers,
doctors, and others of the ~ntelligensia cannot even get their names
on the voting list although they have complied with all legal require-
ments. In one district where a .1iberal minded governor did permit a
reasonably fair election, the vote ran 801. against the Uniao Na9ional.
The result was that within 48 hours the governor was compelled to resign
for "reasons of health".
The right of assembly is not recognized and a gathering of more
than 20 persons is an offense punishab e by fine and imprisonment.
~1[Free trade unions are prohibited and only white Portu ese are per-
~ mitted to belong to the Government con ro e yndicatos which, for
all practical purposes, are merely a projection of the Uniao Na9ional.
Strikes are illegal and any attempt by labor to take collective action
is considered an act of subversion. Last month the dock workers in
Louren90 Marques, dissatisfied with their below subsistence wage of
89 cents per day, tied up the port for nearly a week by simply not
reporting for work. Since the stevedores are considered "casual workers"
without signed work contracts and therefore cannot be forced to stay
on the job, the government had no case against them. Nevertheless, the
dreaded Policia Interna9ional de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) quickly moved
in and combed the African quarter for anyone suspected of organizing
[
the work stoppage. Several hundred natives were pulled out of their
~~~ huts in the middle of the night and loaded into army trucks which
~ / hauled them off to·.a:spscicir 6a:lnp'.itt' .the b1!s!.'t';:1:0 date all efforts
by their families:t~ :le~r~:wh~t:1;tis.Ka~p'en~d:-t:o:~hem has been in vain.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Local laWyers with whom I ha~~ i'al~~~ sJ,~v'~t;'fJakkl~ ;thJ~it is
common practice for the PID1:"'to":§hi"p'tiff" to"'th'epenal" co1ony at Sao
Tome without trial Africans suspected of anti-government activities.
One attorney who.has defended both Portuguese and Africans charged
with alleged subversion activity (in one case the detainee was caught
trying to send an appeal to the UN for investigation of conditions in
Mlzambique) told me that although civil rights are guaranteed by .._
statute including right of legal counsel without cost, the police get
around the law by simply not bringing formal charges against the sus-
pect who is often held in detention incommunicado for as long as two
years. In a recent maritime case involving theft of cargo at sea, the
\
attorney for the ship's master secured a reversal of judgment against
his client when his private investigation revealed that the ship's
papers deliberately omitted the fact that several hundred Africans
were being transported as unmanifested cargo from MOzambique to the
penal colony at Sao Tome without having benefit of a court trial. He
also told me that no lifeboats or life preservers are provided for
African passengers on coastal vessels including those that transport
the mine workers recruited by Witwatersrand Native Labor Association.
It can readily be appreciated that any attempt to voice opinion
in opposition to the Salazar regime is to invite harrassment or pos-
.siblearrest if one is a Eur~pean Portuguese. If, on the other hand,
[
one is an African it very likely will mean some kisses from the girl
, with five eyes (the palmat6r-ia, a wooden paddle with which the police
beat the hands and feet of the natives having five holes which suck up
the skin causing great pain and.nleeding) or disappearance into some·
prison camp. The only way to g.auge the degree of dissatisfaction with
Salazar's rule is by the time"consuming process of talking privately
with local Portuguese known for their anti-government sympathy. In the
course of the past year, on the bqsis of talks and travels throughout
the Province, I would offer the following guesstimate of the nature and
extent of the so-called "opposition".
1. The "disaffection" for the Salazar Government is probably
shared by 80% of the European Portuguese living in MOzambique exclusive
of armed forces and the bureaucracy which has a vested interest in its
continuance.
2. The "opposition" is completely unorganized and is in fact a
multitude of individual dissenters rather than a homogeneous group
having a common political philosophy.
CONFIDENTIAL." ••• • ... • ·.. '" • · • ... ..· • • • . • • • . • • · • • • ·• • • • • ... • • • • • • •· • •• • • • • • • • • • • •• • •··
CONFIDENTIAL A-32
Leo. Marques
Page 15.~ .. . .. . .• •• ••• ••• • •• •• ••• ••• • • •• • • ••• ••• ••
3. 0 f the appr oximat elt :1~9.,~OO: .~ur~p~.an••~O;-iu<Jie:~(i! :~ftlibzambique,
about 80% would if given a chance plump for an autonomous state linked
to lIbther Portugal by cultural and linguistic ties. They would, how-
ev ex ,' insist that meaningful political and economic power continue to
be vested in the European community with only token representation for
other races. They are almost unanimous in their acceptance of a multi-
racial society socially speaking but are quick to make the point that
progress for the African must, because of his illiteracy and addiction
to tribal customs, be slow. Their time tables vary from 10-50 years
with the mean about 25.
4. There are among the European community, particularly those
Portuguese born in lIbzambique, a segment numbering about 10% who are
fully prepared to work with and under a government dominated by Africans-_
This far-out group is made up of the intelligensia and professional
classes plus a number of blue-collar workers, particularly artisans who
through hard work and because their skills are in demand live much
better than they ever did or could hope to in Portugal.
I have purposely left any discussion of African opposition to the
last because the police state atmosphere waich prevails in ~bzambique
makes it by far the most difficult to assess. The informer system
operated by PIDE makes it we~l nigh impossible to have contact with
Africans without the Government's knowing about it and thereby placing
the African in jeopardy. Furthermore, the language barrier is extremely
formidable. With an illit€racy r~te estimated at 99%, few Africans
within the urban areas and practically none in the bush know enough
Portuguese to carryon anything but the simplest of conversations.
Despite the fact that the Portuguese are constantly emphasizing their
civilizing influence over a span of five centuries, geography and
Nineteenth Century British colonialism have made Mozambique a Portuguese
island in an English linguistic sea. Africans who go into neighboring
countries to work, and it is estimated upwards to a million do, immedi-
ately find themselves in an English speaking area. Necessity forces
them to learn some English and they can often speak it better than the
Portuguese. In my travels throughout the Province, particularly in .
the Nyasa, Gaza and Cabo Delgado areas, I have found a number of Africans
who could speak to me in English when neither the Chefe de Posto nor
the local administrator could do so.
The great majority of lIbzambique's six and one-half million
Africans still live under the tribal system which, although it lacks
the cohesiveness found in other parts of Africa, sets great store by
language and ethnic origin. There are 9 ethnic and 37 linguistic
groups in lIbzambique. Significantly, these run from west to east with
the result that they stratify the Province making communications
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between the population of tn~:~~ri~. ~~d:so~t~.P~~~ d~f~ic~it. As a
matter of fact, when travelf~ng through the Macondes country along the
Tanganyika border my driver who is Shangana from the southern part of
the Province could not even ask road directions unless we were fortunate
enough to encounter a native who knew some Portuguese. The importance
of this problem in organizing any national liberation movement is
quite apparent, particularly if the only safe haven for the insurgents·
is an English speaking country like Tanganyika, which is over 2,000
land miles from the more populated areas of the south.
In trying to assess the political potential of the African in
MOzambique the most difficult problem is how to establish meaningful
contact with him. His relations with the Portuguese and most other
Europeans is that of master and serf, which is not likely to be con-
ducive to mutual trust or a free exchange of ideas and confidences.
There are exceptions and the Consulate General has used these to try
and find out what the African thinks about the current situation
particularly with respect to political changes now taking place in
nearby countries. Although still woefully ignorant of what goes on
outside his own little world of family and tribe, the word is gradu-
ally seeping through. The returning African mine worker from the
Transvaal, the house servants and laborers from Rhodesia and Nyasaland
t·ogether ".vith the sisal wcrkers from Tanganyika all bring back tales
of life on the outside which is having a very definite influence on
the thinking of the indigenous population. The transistor radio and
the daily broadcasts from.newly independent or nearly independent.
states in Portuguese, English aridcertain native languages have
served to break through the tight censorship of press and radio im-
posed by the Portuguese Government. In the ports of Beira and Lourenqo
Marques foreign seamen, many of whom speak Spanish and Portuguese as
well as English have said and done things to arouse the political
curiousity of the Africans. Pamphlets and tracts are circulated and
in one instance a strike notice·complete with picketing instructions
was found on the deck of a foreign vessel. It is difficult to estimate
how widespread this is but the fact remains that it does exist
and seems to be growing.
Among the scores of Europeans with whom I have discussed the
situation all are in agreement that the African usually does not trust
the white man. There are some exceptions. One is the small group of
"opposition" lawyers who have formed a pool of legal talent to defend
persons both Portuguese and Africans accused of anti-government activi-
ties. They seem to have established some rapport with the Africans but
quite naturally are somewhat reluctant to be put in the position of
feeding information to the official foreign community particularly
Americans. Another exception is a handful of the intelligensia who
find the repressio~.of.t?~ ~f~iQa~s.p~~c~ol~~~~~~ly revolting and who
would like to do sprjle;t.hi;pg;abo;tti:~t l;>u",:::loon;~.~o;w how. The largest. ..... .... . .
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and most·~roadly bas7d grout~~r f~o~e ~@n~~?i:~ith ~~e~n~igenous·probably a s the nn, s saonary \/ii~&h ~'S t::h:V'l.clect ~~td' i::WO' brartches. The
,)Protestant numbering about 100, mostly Americans of the Methodist
1 faith, who operate within a 300 mile radius of Lourenqo Marques, and
the Catholics, numbering approximately 1200, one-half of whom are of
Portuguese nationality who operate throughout the Province with heavy
concentration in the central and northern areas. Of the non Portuguese
Catholic missionaries, the Italians are the most numerous, being a bou.f "
200, followed by the Dutch, German, Belgian and Spanish, in that order.
While the Catholic missionaries are less suspect than the
Protestants because of the official church-state relationship and the
fact that approximately one-half are Portuguese, even they are finding
that their work with the natives is being greatly restricted. For
example, the recent encyclical of the late Pope John XXIII was initi-
ally declared subversive by the government censor and its publication
prohibited until the Bishop of Beira threatened to publish it under
his own seal. Several non Portuguese priests in the Cabo Delgado
district have told me that they have had their mission stoned by irate
Portuguese who accused them of inciting the natives with false doctrines
in the mission schools and seminaries. The priests try to keep politics
out of the classroom but are finding it increasingly difficult to
teach Christianity without casting some doubt on the Salazar Govern-
ment's regard for hu~an dignity and individual rights. Eecause of
their special relationship ~ith the government, the Catholic missionaris
do not enjoy the confidences of the Africans and they realize this.
They watch the young Africans disappearing in ever-increasing numbers
from the mission schools without explanation and suspect that they have
fled the country to join the Mozambique Liberation Front (MLF) in Dar
es Salaam. They also note an increasing revolt against mission dis-
cipline on the part of their converts, particularly the youth--both
girls and boys. They are genuinely concerned that the Church is losing
out in the struggle not only for the soul but for the mind of the new
generation of Africans and frankly confess they are at a loss to know
how or where to combat it.
Because the Protestants are almost all American citizens and
since their area of operation is closer to Lourenqo Marques, the
Consulate General is more conversant with their operations and prob-
lems. The fact that the majority are Methodists, the pet peeve of
the Portuguese Government because of their alleged implication in the
1961 uprising in Angola, has as might be expected caused the missionarie
to look to the Consulate General for aid and comfort.
During the past year I have visited every mission station staffed
by Americans. On the basis of many lengthy conversations with the
missionaries concerning their relations with the native population, I
'''1I e, ""'0 " " ••• (10;,1
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The basis of the relationship between the missionaries and
the Jliricans is entirely different from that which exists between
the native and other Europeans. The missionary by the very nature of
his calling comes to give to the African not to take from him. Leaving
aside for the moment any consideration of the spiritual benefits, the v.
African profits from his association with the missionary in a material_
sense. First of all, he receives certain educational advantages in-
cluding basic instruction in the Portuguese language which is the pass~
key to the government school system. In some cases he may also get
board and room and training in the fundamentals of farming, carpentry
and mechanical training; or, if a girl, in home economics, public
health, and child welfare. In the case of the Protestant missions
he receives in addition to the foregoing, substantial medical benefits;~
including access to clinic and hospital facilities. For the girls,
the missions give courses designed to train the African as nurses and
midwives. The seminaries train Africans as native pastors and instruct
them in the fundamentals of social organization, including on-the-job
training in management and fiscal matters. Under such circumstances
one would assume that the missionary would be readily acceptable not
only as a teacher and spiritual advisor but as a friend and confidante
as well. Unfortunately, such is not the case.
The African is most CLrCUffi3pectin his dealings with the mission-
[aries. He offers no information on his thoughts and studiously avoids
lany dialogue which might cause him to·reveal his opinions or prejudices.
Despite his reticence, the missionaries are aware of the Africans' in-
volvement in the current struggle for greater participating in the
political and-economic life of the community, not through what he say
but rather because of what he doesn't say. The exceptions are found
among the more advanced students in-the seminaries who under the guise
of religious curiousity often question their teachers on the consistency
of Christian doctrine with the actions of Christian governments toward
their subjects. Some mission directors, who are administrators rather
than preachers, have tried to peek behind the curtain of silence that
screens the Africans' inner thoughts from his white benefactors. They
have been able by piecing together bits of information and by means of
daily observation to arrive at certain conclusions. For example, their
inquiries concerning the increasing incidence of the disappearance by
young men from mission activities has failed to bring forth the normal
responses: a, he has gone to work in the Transvaal mines or b, he was
picked up by the police. Neither the joy_of the former nor the sorrow-
of the latter is evident. Quite often after the question has been asked
several times the reply of the African's family is to the effect, that
the young man has left the country, but just where he has gone or for
what purpose rema~~s .~~~s~~!~d~ ••I~.t~~s qopne9~ion a pattern which
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service in the Portuguese ar:lited··fotce·~'S'e~rris-Co De' emerging. In
activities outside of the classroom such as field work and social
gathsrings, the missionaries have noticed that there is a tendency for
the Africans to gather in small.groups which quickly disperse the
moment a missionary approaches.· Among a few of the older native pastors
there are some who very frankly express their concern over the fact ..'._
that they no longer are able to command either the attention or the
respect of their own youth.: These frequently unburden themselves to
the missionaries saying that there is a great deal of "wild talk»
about Lfber atLcn.tend driving\ the Portuguese out. It is very apparent
that the pastors· themselves, arevnot; privy' to the underground movement
which is very evidentally in progress.
-_.' < -' ,.,' .- . '.' ..-. .,.., .'; ,. • . ' ".': •.','.' •.' .' - ~.'". ',_ ~;_;;'._!..~-.__ \.:;~-~.~., "" ... ,_ _ ._".:r,.~.,.' ,"... ;.: s ,» _ " _.
'" In:'response to' my question' as to why the African apparently does
riot trust "the mission,aries I,get. several answers. Some missionaries say
that while it is' true that .the mission,gives and the African gets it
is'always the whiteman who. exercises authority and usually in a very1 arbitrary llianner~'Discipline is always meted out by the white man" "
never the African. .Other missionaries feel that the fact that the
mission has to work closely with the Portuguese officials brings them'
under suspicion.' For' example~:thelaw requires that the presence of
all guests remaining over twelve hours, both Europeans and Africans,
must be reported to the police. For this reason, the missionaries are
required to go to the Chefe ~e Posta several times a week in order to
report on routine visitors.
<. ,C-·,·•.;" ".
Over four centuries of Portuguese occupation has convinced the
Africans that if the missionaries are permitted to operate they must
spy for the government otherwise they would be put out of 'business.
Then there are a certain number of~ssionaries who become so immersed
in the language and customs of the indigenous population that they go
»native"i in some cases marrying, Africans and giving up their missionary
work to accommodate themselves to the African way of life. This group
takes the position that the Africans, fearing the Portuguese might
torture the missionaries if they thought they had any information on'
anti-government activit~, believe the best protection for their bene-
factors is to keep them ignvrant of what is actually going on. For
whatever reasons, it is apparent that any information the missionary
gets on the political aspirations or activities of the indigenous popu-
lation they acquired on their own'not from the African. On the basis
of my observations any fear that-the Portuguese Government has that
the missionaries are conniving with the African population against
them is without foundation, unless. it is assumed that the,Christian
doctrine itself is subversive which, in the minds of some Portuguese
officials, it well may be.," ,.
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impenetrable barrier that stands between him and the white man. It
explains why even third generation European ~Dzambicanos who speak
several of the native languages are the first to admit they do not know
the African and have as yet devised no means of getting through to him.
As I noted earlier, there are a few special cases where Europeans seem
to have won the Africans' confidence, but this relationship is pretty
much restricted to those who have suffered at the hands of the Portu-
guese themselves or have openly and effectively helped the African in
his fight against his oppressor; i.e., lawyers, opposition leaders,
certain intelligensia.
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n the absence of any direct channel to the indigenous population
or to s eaders , an ~n ~on on their thoug S, r ac-
tivities particularly iJl the politici9J.-field _Eli be gleaReEi By patient
d persistent rubbin - in the hi--u the Province.
Tn~s n turn requires ex en si.ve travel on the part of the Consulate
General staff and exhaustive conversations with all those who have any
kind of official, social, or commercial contact with the indigenous
population. The deceptive nature of the government-sponsored tours
given to official visitors particularly members of the press is typical
of the police state approach to creating a favorable international image.
re is indeed unfortunate that this charade practiced with all the
natural charm and inherent hospitality of the Portuguese should have
been so effective in camouflaging the true situation.
I have made no attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the
Mozambique Liberation Front inside Mozambique or to estimate its
strength. The truth is that under present conditions we simply do not
know nor do we have any dependable means of finding out. From all the
. diverse bits and pieces we have it is possible to put together a
mosaic of general dissention and indicate some examples of African at-
tempts to do something about it; For the moment the best and possibly
only available source of hard intelligence on the nature and direction
of the freedom movement is to be found in Dar es Salaam, which shelters
the headquarters of the Mozambique Liberation Front.
On the basis of available information and with due recognition of
the sources from which it has been gathered, I have reached the follow-
ing conclusions:
1. Four and one-half centuries of Portuguese repression has
built up a volcano of resentment in Mozambique which under present day
conditions in Africa is certain to erupt in the not too distant future.
2. The Portuguese security force comprised of some 20,000 troops...·. .·. .
"• • •
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•• ••• •• • •• ••••••••••••• •• ••• ••• • •• •• ••••• • • •• • • ••• ••• ••together ·with a large and e~f,,<:ie~t,polH!e f:orde:iHd@d: by: ihousands of
paid informers have the capabilltY'to'malnfain iniernal·security unless
substantial outside aid in the form of men, money, arms and training
is made available to the dissidents and can be effectively geared to a
widespread campaign of civil disobedience having broad-based support
among the Province's six and one-half million Africans,
.
3. While the size and shape of the liberation movement is unknown,
there is substantial evidence that it does exist and exercises inftuence
among the natives. There is no longer any doubt that Eduardo ~bndlane
is well known and apparently highly respected not only by the tribes
in the south where he was born but also among those in the central and
northern areas as well.
4. Within the next few months Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia
will achieve independence thereby making available additional sanctu-
aries for the Mozambique freedom fighters which in turn will cause the
Portuguese defense forces to be spread out dangerously thin.
5. Last month's dock strike in Lourenqo Marques which effectively
tied up the port for several days was on admission of the Province's
Chief of Police politically inspired. Recent fires which have destroyed
two important edible oil and cashew processing plants in the north indi-
cate that sabotage may already be taking place.
6. The rapidly deteriorating economicsituation together with
world-wide condemnation of Portuguese policy toward its overseas ter-
ritories have seriously undermined the confidence of both the foreign
and local Portuguese communities in the present government's ability to
survive. A majority of the European Portuguese are opposed to the
Salazar regime and would welcome some form of autonomous status for
the Province as long as political and economic power remain in European
hands.
8. A very small minority of the Portuguese community would be
willing to live with and under an African dominated government •.
9. The fact that ethnic and linguistic lines run from west to
east effectively stratify the Province and, given the vital need of
Mozambique's land-locked neighbors to secure free and sovereign access
to the sea, there is a distinct possibility of the Province's fragmenta-
tion. This could occur as a result of a UN supervised plebescite with
the various groups exercising their right of self-determination to
seek affiliation with kindred tribesmen in neighboring states, or it
could come about by acts of aggression on the part of newly independent
states in pursuit of what they consider would be vital national object-
ives mainly the ac~i~ition of deep wqter ports. If fragmentation
should take place ,:'~¥~strn~dnepl' p~:t 01: 'tn~':Province would very
likely be annexed j:)!~art9ar!Yika~ ."Th~ ~a j:)e't:w~~the Inario and
Zambezi River s would 'probab.Ly ~o to 1'lyas·a:lal1d::.·The portion between
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the Zambaz i, and Save River s :.r~r¥ l:i-\:=e!ly:w~ul:J.b~~oiUe~i~t: ell the
Rh odesi as , This would leave-on=1y i:nE!'·:south~rrt·ext'renfi.t:v~brdering
on South Africa and Swaziland which would very likely have to be set
up as a separate entity with its integrity guaranteed by international
agreement.
10. Geographically the British colonial policy in East Africa has
made Portuguese MozaIiliiquean island in a British linguistic sea. .~
Whether MozaIiliiqueachieves independence or is divided up among its
land-locked neighbors it is obvious that English not Portuguese will
have to be accepted as the lingua franca of the area. For this reason,
it is not impossible under such circumstances that English might sup-
plant Portuguese as the official language much as it did Spanish in the
Philippines.
Possible Courses of Action
In the lightof the foregoing what courses of action should
the United States Government take with respect to the Portuguese over-
seas territories in furtherance of its announced policy of support
for the right of all peoples to self-determination. It is self-evident
that given the present police state conditions which exist in Mozambique
and the announced determination of the Salazar Government to defend
at all costs the fictional u~itary relationship of the overseas ter-
ritories to the Metropole, any appearance of support for the ifbzar,~ique
Liberation movement would not only be unproductive but very likely woule
result in the complete isolation .and immobilization of the Consulate
General. On the other hand, as the recognized leader of the free
world dedicated to the principle of individual rights and the dignity
of man, we cannot permit our image to become coroded by a policy of
apparent calloused indifference to the perpetuation of repression and
inhuman treatment by a government alien in both race and culture to
those it governs. Not only our national tradition but any realistic
approach to the future role of the United States in Africa makes it
mandatory that our nation continue to be the light at the end of the
tunnel for those still living under tyranny. For this reason it
essential that the indi en ow-a:" h as
p e nited States, its people and policies. This will
require a vigorou ~~ation and cultural
am, w ose composition must be such that it can somehow surv~ve
POI~ese censorship yet be capable of putting across its message to
its primary target, the African community. In spite of our previous
flat tire attempts in this direction, I am not persuaded that it is an
impossible task. Even without benefit of any official USIS program,
the Consulate General has by begging books, handing out unsold American
magazines, lending films discarded by other United States agencies,
hardly any of which aF.fti;.n.i;.1;te.~o.:r;tt:~~s:=1.aIl'iI~~9'e,managed to build
.lJ~ • • ~ ... ;." Jo~~ o. • ~ w.. ~ . 0.. ~ ~ ~.. ... . . .. . . ... ... .. .. ...CON F:rD'Eli'ITAi;.
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up a Province-wide clientel~; ~O~ Qp. ~~h ~re:Afcic~f.:.~f we had
a projector· this program wottl~'be·even "more effective, but unfortunately
our only projector had to be junked a year ago, and most organizations
do npt have one of their own.· In all fairness to the Portuguese of-
ficials it must be said that they have never refused censorship
clearance on any film we have submitted to them.
" -:. ,,' .
Now· and for thefores~eable future one of MOzambique's greatest-
needs will be in the field of education. We should leave no stone
r) unturned.to provide educational opportunities at all levels including
resident scholarships in other African countries and the United States.
Certainly we should embark onvan. English language progr~. On the
basis of my experience in other areas, this is one of t~ most success-
ful of all undertakings •. Even where revolutions have occurred and
anti-US parties ha.ve'come into power ,they usually agree to a continuance
of the English language classes. Here in Mozambique knowledge of
English is essential if the African. is to have any kind of contact.
with his neighbors. Due to the.importance of British and South African
interests in the fields of shipping, banking and commerce, the English
/language is often the Africans' passkey to'employment and/or promotion.
An English language program should be high up on the list of priorityprojects for Mozambique. ,.
• ~ ._ '0 ~- •• ' •
As long as the present~p~iice st~te climate continues, the col-
lection of intelligence on the thoughts, plans and activities of the
African community will be a most difficult and delicate task. The
absence of ready access to the African population for reasons I have
already outlined makes mandatory greater coverage in scope to make up
for a deficiency in depth and intensity. In other words, we have to
circulate more in order to get less. To achieve maximum coverage re-
quires that a substantial percentage of the Consulate General staff
be on the move throughout the Province a good deal of the time and,
insofar as discretion permits,- establish contact with all segments of
its mu Iti-racial society. .Thi s requires pe:rsonnel, travel funds and
I. transportatio~ .
The fact. that Lourenqo Marques is located some 2,000 land miles
from the Tanganyika border, most likely trouble spot in the initial
stages of any guerrilla activity, makes proper coverage most difficult.
2, Beira, the Province's second largest city and principal sea port for
the one-half billion dollars worth of exports from the Rhodesias and
NyaeeLandj , lies' 900 miles north of Lour enco Marques. As the traditional
hot bed of Portuguese opposition to the Salazar regime, it already is
important from the political standpoint. In the not too distant future
it very likely will be the only post in the Province from which to ob-
serve the political developments in the areas north of the Zambezi,
since informal tr~ye~.~e~tr~ct~oDfl p~~ glr~~qy Reing applied to the
districts of Nias~a: and:Cabo ilJ:!lgado::Sev~r'.al:fOreign countries already
\lo .. Q ~.. ... .. .. 0;.. ... ..... . .. .. ..
... .. .. .. .. .. .. ' .... .. ...... .. ...... .. ..
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I feel it is unwise to try anQvcover'tni~ ;ensitive region with only
a Consular Agent who has recently had his pilot's license suspended
for ~lleged unfriendly conduct toward the host government. Self-
'government for Nyasaland and Rhodesia in 1964 will put Beira on the
doorstep of two new safe havens for the MOzambique Liberation Front
activity and guerrilla infiltration. The Beira area because
of economic as well as political importance to its land-locked neighbors
very likely will become a focal point in the future of MOzambique.
The present day pace of events in southern Africa requires speedy
transmission of information between field posts and the horneoffice in
Washington. Recent events in Saigon have demonstrated how helpless
a diplomatic mission can be if it.is dependent for its communications
~ .service on the host government. Under existing conditions thlS could
very easily happen in MOzambique. We are at the mercy of the govern-
ment owned and operated telephone and telegraph system. Given the
hypersensitivity of the Portuguese the odds are definitely against
our getting unfavorable information out of the country should an up-
rising take place. We have an urgent need for our own communications
system and immediate action should be initiated to get it.
I seriously doubt Portugal's ability to long contain the unrest
that si mmers just beLow the"surface despite the deceptive stability
or the moment. 1de should be f or n.uLat in.r plans errd pr o.j r ams desi']"neci.
LO provide o-the-spot assistance when the preSSTIc~slitical order
changes. Whether self-government, independence or fragmentation over-
takes Mozambique it will need teachers, educational facilities and
equipment, technical assistance and very likely substantial amount of
food grains. We should not be caught with our plans down when the
confrontation takes place.
1V intention in writing this review was not to develop a think
piece but to provide a worm's eye view of the problem as it appears to
someone immersed in the day to day operations of a post caught in the
no-man's land between a dictatorship that is plunging headlong into·
the 16th Century and the dynamic African nationalism of the second half
of the 20th Century.
~&
American Consul General
.I;'-r/
o. ... • .., • · •• •• • • • ,.. ••• • • • • • • · • • • · • • · •· • · , · "Oil • • • • ·· • •• ·" • • · • • • • .. • .. • ·• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •·.. . • .. .. ··.. ··..
CONFIDENTIAL
